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Earlier empirical literature has examined some long- and medium-term aspects of 
macro-fiscal volatility while leaving its short-term fiscal impact unexplored. To help 
fill that gap, we examine the impact of macro-fiscal volatility on the composition of 
public spending. To that end, we analyse a panel of 10 EU countries during 1991—
2007. Our results suggest that contemporaneous increases in the volatility of regularly 
collected revenues such as the VAT and income taxes tend to tilt the expenditure 
composition in favour of public investment. In contrast, increases in the volatility of 
ad hoc –type of taxes such as capital taxes tend to favour public consumption 
spending. A possible explanation to these differences concerns news about the 
underlying economic conditions embedded in short-term volatility changes: the policy 
maker may be more inclined to increase public investment in response to persistent 
changes in the economic conditions, while temporary changes may prompt a reaction 
on consumption spending. 
 
 21. Introduction 
 
The volatility of macro-economic and fiscal variables has become an increasingly 
fashionable topic. A number of recent empirical papers, reviewed below, have sought 
to assess the link between macro-fiscal volatility and the volatility or cyclicality of 
public spending. Others have examined the link between macro-fiscal volatility and 
countries’ growth performance. 
 
Earlier literature has thus addressed some issues related to the longer-term (growth) 
and medium-term (cyclicality) aspects of macro-fiscal volatility but, to the best of our 
knowledge, its shorter-term effects have not been examined at all. Specifically, 
volatility and changes in volatility tell us something about “news” to the policy 
maker, and it seems that our knowledge of how policy makers respond to such news is 
almost non-existent.   
 
To start filling this gap, we consider the impact of macro-fiscal volatility on the 
composition of government spending. That is, we study how (changes in) the 
volatility in macroeconomic and fiscal (revenue-side) variables affect the relative 
weights of government investment and government consumption spending. As a 
result, we seek to gain some first insights into fiscal policy responses to short-term 
macro-fiscal volatility. 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify two issues related to the terminology used 
in the remainder of the paper. 
 
First, the terms “public investment (spending)” and “government investment 
(spending)” will be used interchangeably, as is customary in related literature. 
However, as pointed out by Gonzalez Alegre et al. (2008), government investment 
comprises gross fixed asset formation by the general government, while public 
investment also includes investment in government-owned corporations, such as 
many utilities. Thus, although we succumb to custom and frequently refer to public 
investment (spending) below, our sole focus is on government investment (spending).  
 
 3Second, as will become clear in next section, earlier studies have examined public 
expenditure composition in number of different ways, relating the evolution of public 
investment to different other spending categories such as public consumption 
expenditure, primary spending, current expenditure, or even total outlays. Our focus 
will be on the relationship between investment and consumption spending, both 
because that is arguably the economically most relevant comparison, and because 
consumption is most similar to investment as a policy maker’s decision variable; thus, 
by focusing on consumption rather than, e.g., current spending we reduce unwelcome 
noise due to inherent differences between the components constituting our dependent 
variable.   
 
These caveats duly noted we proceed to a review of earlier related literature (section 
2). Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, section 4 interprets the results and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
A few recent empirical papers have considered indicators of macro-fiscal volatility 
either as right-hand side or as left-hand side variables. First, the impact of macro-
fiscal volatility on economic growth has been assessed (Afonso and Furceri, 2008; see 
also Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Second, determinants of government spending 
volatility have been assessed in general (Furceri and Ribeiro, 2008), and the 
cyclicality of different categories of government spending has been studied in 
particular (Lane, 2003), with a special focus on the impact of output volatility. 
 
Starting with macro-fiscal volatility as a determinant of economic growth, Afonso and 
Furceri (2008) estimate the effects of the size and volatility of government spending 
and revenues on output growth. They observe 28 EU and OECD countries over seven 
five-year periods between 1970 and 2004 and specify separate panel growth models 
for government revenues, including their volatility, and government expenditure, 
again including their volatility. They find that both the size and the volatility of 
government spending and revenues have a negative impact on growth. Specifically, 
indirect taxes (size and volatility); social contributions (size and volatility); 
government consumption (size and volatility); subsidies (size); and government 
 4investment (volatility) have a sizeable, negative and statistically significant effect on 
growth. 
 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) investigate the relation between macro-fiscal volatility and 
growth in a panel of 92 countries in the period 1960-85, and in a subset of 24 OECD 
countries in the period 1950-88. They first regress the mean of GDP growth on its 
volatility, finding a significant and negative relationship. They then regress per capita 
GDP growth on a set of control variables—including government spending 
volatility—and on the volatility of the regression residuals, finding a strongly 
significant and negative relationship between government spending volatility and 
growth.  
 
Turning then to the determinants of government spending volatility, Furceri and 
Ribeiro (2008) examine the link between country size and government spending 
volatility. The sample includes observations for 160 countries from 1960 to 2000. The 
authors regress the standard deviation of annual growth in government consumption 
spending on the (log of) population and controls for demographic, geographical and 
macroeconomic factors (GDP per capita, openness, CPI inflation, and government 
size). They conclude that smaller countries tend to have more volatile government 
(consumption) spending. 
 
Finally, considering the impact of output volatility on the composition of government 
spending, Lane (2003) seeks to explain the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy by 
analysing the effects of output volatility (and also power dispersion) on various 
categories of government spending. The sample comprises 22 OECD countries 
observed over the period 1960-98 (annual data). The categories of government 
spending considered are total government spending, government consumption and its 
breakdown between wage and non-wage components, government investment, and 
non-interest total government spending. Lane constructs measures of cyclicality for 
each of these spending categories and regresses them on output volatility, political 
power dispersion, output per capita, openness and the share of public sector 
employment. He concludes that investment is the most pro-cyclical component of 
government spending, while current spending is mildly counter-cyclical. Further, 
countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are most likely to run pro-
 5cyclical fiscal policies, with government wage expenditure as the most important 
channel through which this effect operates. 
 
To sum up, recent work has cast some light on how fiscal volatility affects economic 
growth and on what determines the volatility (or cyclicality) of different types of 
government spending. In general, it has been found that macro-fiscal volatility is 
detrimental for growth and that country size, output volatility and political dispersion 
all affect government spending volatility or cyclicality.  
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Model and estimation methodology 
 
Our goal is to model the determinants of the composition of public expenditure, with a 
special focus on the volatility of macroeconomic and fiscal (revenue-side) variables. 
To that end, we consider the ratio of public investment to public consumption 
spending as our dependent variable. We are interested in estimating short-term 
impacts on the composition of public spending, so we make use of the observation 
that the ratio of public investment to consumption expenditure has shown persistence 
over time
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1 it
     (1) 
 
where uit  i.i.d (0, u
2), with subscript i referring to observations in the cross-section 
dimension (individual countries) and t to observations in the time dimension. 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of public investment to public consumption 
spending (I/C).  
 
                                                 
1 The first-order autocorrelation of that ratio in our sample, described in detail in section 3.2, is as high 
as 0.862. 
 6Our macro-fiscal volatility variables of interest are collected in the second term of (1). 
The macro-volatility variables include the volatility (standard deviation) of real GDP, 
CPI inflation and also total tax revenues. The more specific fiscal volatility variables 
include the standard deviation of four types of tax revenues (taxes on capital; current 
taxes on income and wealth; taxes on production and imports; the Value Added Tax 
(VAT)). These taxes are more closely described in the next section; suffice it to 
mention here that we consider the volatility of these taxes both in levels and in 
relation to GDP.  
 
The third term on the right-hand side of (1) contains a number of control variables X. 
Their role is simply to render the model empirically well-specified, and we do not 
seek to give them any economic interpretation. The selection of controls is based on 
earlier empirical literature summarised in section 2, with a special focus on 
controlling for any cyclical influences. 
 
This dynamic specification of our model (1) allows us to interpret the impact of the 
volatility measures as “news” about the underlying economic conditions to which the 
composition of public spending reacts.
2 The volatility variables measure only the 
impact of any contemporaneous (at time t) change in the standard deviation, as the 
volatility history is entirely captured by the lagged dependent variable. In what is to 
come, such contemporaneous volatility innovations are interpreted as news to the 
policy maker to which he reacts by changing the composition of public spending. 
 
The estimation of (1) will have to account for the correlation between the regressors 
(lagged dependent) and the composite term (i + uit) where γi denotes country-specific 
random effects, which renders least squares estimators inconsistent even 
asymptotically. To circumvent this problem we employ General Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991)
3. To that end, we need to specify a set 
of moment conditions using instruments that are orthogonal to the error term. 
Assuming that the error term is not serially correlated and that the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous, higher-order lags of the dependent variable constitute 
                                                 
2 We adopt here the term “news”, based on Greene (2003, p. 307).  
3 Note that the estimation is done in first differences, eliminating any long-term trend behaviour, the 
constant term, as well as any fixed effects from (1). 
 7valid instruments. (Higher-order) lags of other, possibly endogenous explanatory 
variables can also be used as instruments under the same assumptions. 
 
While identification requires the number of instruments to equal the number of 
explanatory variables, overidentification is in practice necessary, as it both allows the 
testing of the moment conditions and improves efficiency. There is, however, a 
possible trade-off between bias and efficiency when the number of instruments 
(moment conditions) is increased with small samples (see, e.g. Roodman, 2007). We 
employ the Sargan overidentification test, together with a consideration of the 
robustness of coefficient estimates to different instrument sets, as a criterion to 




The dataset consists of a panel of 10 EU member states
4, with annual data for the 
period 1991-2007. Due to the unbalancedness of the panel the total number of 
observations is 121—138. 
 
The ratio of public investment to public consumption expenditure is depicted in 
Figure 1. That ratio is, on average, about 0.1, which seems high at the outset, given 
that total government expenditure in our sample is roughly 50 percent of GDP while 
investment only amounts to some 2.5 percent of GDP. While we consider government 
investment as is customary (gross fixed capital formation of the general government), 
our focus on government consumption means that some categories of current 
spending, such as interest payments and some subsidies and transfers, are excluded 
from our denominator. 
 
More specifically, and following Straub and Tchakarov (2007), we employ the 
variable “final consumption expenditure of the general government”, as defined in the 
UN System of National Accounts, to account for governments’ true consumption 
spending. It comprises non-market output and social transfers in kind related to 
expenditure on products supplied to households via market producers. Final 
                                                 
4 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. 
 8consumption expenditure thus defined amounts on average to 25 percent of GDP in 
our sample. All data on government investment are obtained from Eurostat, while the 
data on government consumption originate from the OECD. 
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Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations. 
 
Turning then to our variables of interest, we construct a time series of annual 
observations on the standard deviation of each volatility variable of interest. We 
assume that public expenditure composition in year t can be affected by the volatility 
of revenues in year t and t-1 but that further lags do not add any explanatory power. 
The annual observations on the volatility of revenues are computed on the basis of a 
rolling window covering eight quarters, covering the year of the observation on the 
dependent and the preceding year. In other words, the volatility variables explaining 
public expenditure composition in year t are calculated on the basis of quarterly 
observations in year t and t-1. The standard deviations are calculated using seasonally 
adjusted quarterly data.  
 
The macro-volatility variables comprise real GDP (labelled volrealgdp henceforth, 
source Eurostat) and CPI inflation (“volinflation”, source OECD). We also consider 
the volatility of total tax revenues, both in levels and as a share of GDP (“voltaxtot” 
and “voltaxtot_gdp”, respectively, source Eurostat), among the macro-volatility 
indicators. 
 
 10Volatility indicators for individual sub-groups of taxes are based on the breakdown of 
taxes according to European System of Accounts (ESA), version 1995, and include 
current taxes on income and wealth (abbreviated “taxiw” in subsequent tables); taxes 
on capital (“taxc”); taxes on production and imports (“taxpm”); and the VAT 
(“taxvat” or “vat”).  
 
  Current taxes on income and wealth comprise all taxes levied regularly on 
personal and corporate income, as well as taxes on capital gains.  
 
  Taxes on capital include ad hoc taxes such as inheritance taxes, death duties, taxes 
on gifts and so-called betterment levies (e.g., taxes on the increase in land value 
due to planning permissions).  
 
  Taxes on production and imports include taxes on products except the VAT 
(general sales or turnover taxes, excise duties, stamp taxes, taxes on financial and 
capital transactions, car registration taxes, export duties, etc.); taxes on imports 
(import duties and all other taxes on imports, excluding the VAT); and other taxes 
on production (e.g., payroll taxes, property taxes on enterprises, licence fees, 
pollution taxes).  
 
All these taxes, including also the VAT, are reported at the level of the general 
government. The volatility measures are constructed as explained above, based on a 
backward-looking eight-quarter rolling window. The volatilities are calculated on 
each tax type in level terms and in relation to GDP. 
 
Finally, the set of significant controls include log real GDP per capita (log_gdp_pc; 
source OECD); public debt relative to GDP (debt_gdp; source Ameco); and external 
trade balance relative to GDP (extbal_gdp; source OECD). We also report the 
(insignificant) coefficient estimates for a dummy variable indicating EMU 
participation (emu). We also consider the interaction term of each tax volatility 
variable (in level terms) and the real GDP variable, so as to discern the direct effect of 
the tax volatility on the composition of public spending and its indirect effect through 
GDP (business cycle). 
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Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the estimation.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the data 
N mean max min sd
IC 160 0.104 0.177 0.025 0.031
volrealgdp 158 2549.882 10433.5 247.124 2504.076
volinfl 142 0.330 1.156 0.069 0.181
voltaxtot 158 1751.951 7529.375 86.280 1652.336
voltaxtot_gdp 158 0.223 1.419 0.009 0.210
voltaxiw 158 700.413 3589.953 7.009 755.090
voltaxiw_gdp 158 0.148 0.520 0.006 0.123
voltaxc 158 29.264 316.740 0.132 48.525
voltaxc_gdp 158 0.009 0.093 0.000 0.015
voltaxpm 158 703.948 2653.672 28.039 645.411
voltaxpm_gdp 158 0.103 1.044 0.003 0.146
voltaxvat 158 350.745 1287.957 18.817 320.985
voltaxvat_gdp 158 0.052 0.221 0.002 0.041
log_GDP_pc 160 8.790 12.587 4.259 3.050
debt_gdp 160 0.671 1.340 0.221 0.255
extbal_gdp 160 0.029 0.115 -0.032 0.033
emu 170 0.618 1.000 0.000 0.487 
 
Panel unit root test results are reported in Annex 1, including both the Levin, Lin and 
Chu test assuming homogeneity in the individual unit root processes, and the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin test allowing for individual heterogeneity in the unit root processes. 
Both tests confirm that all variables are difference stationary.  
 
Annex 2 reports correlation coefficients between the volatility variables. The macro-
economic volatility variables are highly correlated with the tax volatility variables, 
especially in level terms, so we perform separate analyses of how the former affect the 
composition of public spending and how the latter affect it. 
 
Similarly, the correlation coefficients among the tax volatility variables, when based 
on real levels data, are high, in some cases 0.8—0.9. The only exception is the capital 
tax volatility variable, whose correlation coefficient with the other tax volatilities 
never exceeds 0.5. We therefore group the tax volatilities into three groups within 
which correlations are low—combining the capital tax volatility with each of the 
others—and run separate regressions for each group. In contrast, when measured 
relative to GDP the tax volatilities are much less correlated with one another, with the 





In this section we report the estimation results for the preferred specifications of   
model (1). The results with macro-economic volatility variables as regressors are 
reported first, including the volatility of aggregate tax revenues, followed by the 
results with the volatility of sub-groups of taxes as regressors. The tables below show 
the preferred model specifications in terms of the variables treated as endogenous; the 
number of lags included as instruments; and the set of control variables employed. 
The robustness of the estimation results to changes in the specification is discussed as 
appropriate. The interpretation of the results from an economic perspective is done in 
section 4. 
 
Starting with the impact of macro-economic volatility on the composition of public 
spending, Table 2 shows the results with real GDP volatility, CPI inflation volatility, 
and total tax revenue volatility as regressors. Table 2 shows seven different model 
specifications (A—G) which differ mainly in terms of the controls and variables 
treated as endogenous. In all cases the number of lags of the dependent and the 
endogenous variables used as instruments is 3. This choice is based on the Sargan test 
for overidentifying restrictions (shown at the bottom of the table), as well as on the 
observation that coefficient estimates change materially as the number of lags is 
increased. This suggests a possible bias from employing too many instruments; hence, 
we opt for a small number of lags, possibly losing some efficiency in the estimation. 
Tests for the first and second order residual autocorrelation are also shown at the 
bottom of the table.   
 
We note based on the diagnostic test results that all seven models are well specified; 
however, the test statistic for the Sargan test suggests a possible problem with the set 
of overidentifying restrictions for specification C, where GDP alone is included and is 
considered endogenous. That is also the only specification where the coefficient for 
the lagged dependent is insignificant and much smaller in magnitude than otherwise. 
 
 13In specifications A, D and E both GDP and public debt are endogenous. GDP is 
insignificant throughout, but lagged public debt (to GDP) is significant. Note that we 
can interpret the GDP variable as controlling for the impact of business cycles, given 
that the estimation is done in first differences (which eliminates any trend effects) and 
given that the data frequency is annual (which eliminates any seasonal effects). 
 
Both real GDP volatility and CPI inflation volatility are strongly insignificant 
throughout, as is the control variable trade openness. (In A the EMU dummy was also 
included but is not shown due to insignificance.) The macro-economic volatility 
variables are also insignificant in the most parsimonious specification B. 
 
Consequently, innovations to neither GDP volatility nor inflation volatility affect the 
composition of public spending in our sample. Note that the dynamic specification of 
the model implies that the estimated impact of the volatility variables measures the 
impact of contemporaneous innovations to them, over and above the impact of the 
lagged dependent.  
 
Columns F and G show the preferred specification with the volatility of total tax 
revenues (in levels) and the volatility of total tax revenues as a share of GDP, 
respectively, as a regressor. The volatility of total tax revenues is insignificant when 
measured in levels, but weakly significant when measured in relation to GDP. In the 
latter case it has a negative sign, implying that a contemporaneous increase in 
volatility tends to reduce the dependent variable, that is, increase the relative share of 
public consumption spending at the cost of public investment.       
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Table 2. Estimation results: Macro-volatility  
(dependent variable: ratio of public investment to public consumption spending) 
 















LD.i_c 0.335** 0.467** 0.119** 0.346** 0.335** 0.673** 0.256**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.320) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
D.log_gdp_pc 0.077 -0.201+ 0.097 0.077 0.040
(0.599) (0.106) (0.502) (0.597) (0.769)
LD.log_gdp_pc -0.136 0.160 -0.162 -0.136 -0.116
(0.345) (0.186) (0.246) (0.343) (0.375)
D.debt_gdp 0.038 0.041 0.038 0.022
(0.423) (0.393) (0.421) (0.618)
LD.debt_gdp -0.1090** -0.114** -0.109** -0.079*
(0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.056)
D.volrealgdp 0.000 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.221) (0.304) (0.102) (0.217) (0.219) (0.243)
D.volinflation 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.004







Number of observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
lags 3333 3 3
p_sar
3
gan 0.289 0.279 0.075 0.260 0.269 0.238 0.130
p_ar1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p_ar2 0.623 0.695 0.614 0.605 0.622 0.832 0.617
note:  ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.12  
 
As the evidence concerning the impact of the volatility of total tax revenues is weak 
and inconclusive, we consider next the volatility of individual sub-groups of taxes on 
the composition of public spending. The estimation results are shown in Table 3—5. 
Each table shows a different combination of tax volatilities in levels, based on the 
sample correlation properties as explained above. Both (the log of per capita) GDP 
and public debt relative to GDP are considered endogenous to ensure robustly 
satisfactory diagnostic test results. To test the robustness of the estimation results with 
respect to changes in controls (including interaction terms), each table shows eight 
different model specifications (A—H), together with the corresponding diagnostic test 
results. The coefficient estimates of interest are indicated in bold. When discussing 
the results we bear in mind the interpretation of the coefficient estimates based on the 
dynamic model specification, although the discussion is given a more straight-forward 
spin for ease of comprehension.    
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Table 3 considers the volatility of taxes on income and wealth as well as on capital (in 
levels, specifications A—D), as well as all tax volatilities in relation to GDP 
(specifications E—H). The difference between Tables 3—5 in terms of specifications 
E—H concerns the interaction terms; Table 3 focuses on the interaction terms 
between GDP and the volatilities of taxes on income and wealth as well as capital.    
 
Starting with the tax volatilities in levels, we note that the volatility of taxes on 
income and wealth is significant and positive throughout, while the volatility of 
capital taxes is significant and negative throughout. The interaction term between 
GDP and the volatility of taxes on income and wealth is significant and negative, 
while the interaction term between GDP and the volatility of capital taxes is 
insignificant. Of the controls, GDP and public debt (to GDP) are both significant, 
especially their lags, while neither trade openness nor the EMU dummy is significant. 
 
In sum, innovations to the volatility of taxes on income and wealth tend to increase 
public investment relative to consumption spending, but their indirect impact through 
GDP dampens that increase. Innovations to the volatility of capital taxes tend to 
reduce public investment relative to consumption spending. 
 
Consider then specifications E—H, focussing on the volatilities of these taxes relative 
to GDP. All controls behave as above, with the estimated coefficients remarkably 
stable. The volatility of taxes on income and wealth relative to GDP is predominantly 
significant and positive, and the volatility of capital taxes relative to GDP is 
predominantly significant and negative. The interaction terms behave as above. 
 
All in all, the volatility of taxes on income and wealth has a robustly positive direct 
impact, increasing public investment relative to consumption. The indirect cyclical 
effect dampens that relative gain of public investment. The volatility of capital taxes 
has a robust negative direct impact, decreasing public investment relative to 
consumption. 
 16Table 3. Estimation results: Focus on taxes on income and wealth as well as on 
capital  
(dependent variable: ratio of public investment to public consumption spending) 
 
  A B C D E F G H 
    coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value
LD.i_c  0.228793** 0.251217** 0.207281** 0.230412** 0.300198** 0.240334** 0.232415** 0.270123**
  (0.007545) (0.002693) (0.020572) (0.005855) (0.000435) (0.005975) (0.006836) (0.002012)
D.log_gdp_pc  0.168883+  0.189519*  0.194885*  0.180651*  0.174148+ 0.152396 0.165895 0.137008
  (0.110378) (0.075607) (0.063241) (0.088136) (0.112543) (0.162703) (0.121339) (0.216727)
LD.log_gdp_pc  -0.224076** -0.249594** -0.238574** -0.221615** -0.238261** -0.258703** -0.271241** -0.222620**
  (0.031779) (0.015652) (0.019928) (0.032446) (0.030571) (0.019607) (0.012313) (0.045885)
D.debt_gdp  0.075490*  0.071932+  0.087893**  0.077915* 0.034199 0.026144 0.024537 0.020779
  (0.076538) (0.100871) (0.034397) (0.072627) (0.414874) (0.507364) (0.532743) (0.605960)
LD.debt_gdp  -0.150808** -0.148278** -0.153946** -0.137844** -0.102235** -0.106416** -0.108052** -0.093779**
  (0.000479) (0.000502) (0.000367) (0.001073) (0.016209) (0.008714) (0.007631) (0.023620)
D.voltaxiw  0.000004*  0.000004* 0.000018** 0.000018**     
  (0.065290)  (0.087637)  (0.025375)  (0.012871)    
D.voltaxc -0.000139**  -0.000134**  -0.000126  -0.000145**    
  (0.000101)  (0.000105)  (0.503659)  (0.000041)    
D.extbal_gdp  -0.102777    -0.121021+ -0.102942 -0.058021 -0.036545 -0.033876 -0.016660
  (0.159396)   (0.103982) (0.147609) (0.436528) (0.620785) (0.644298) (0.823450)
D.emu  0.004166   0.003843   0.001825 0.003969 0.003716 0.002531
  (0.344540)   (0.385678)   (0.689219) (0.381110) (0.408369) (0.575448)
D.voltaxiw_loggdppc     -0.000002+  -0.000002**     
     (0.105388)  (0.030561)    
D.voltaxc_loggdppc     -0.000006      
     (0.893333)     
D.voltaxiw_gdp       -0.008966 0.078863** 0.081129** 0.083157**
       (0.415097)  (0.028891)  (0.021125)  (0.021201)
D.voltaxpm_gdp         -0.009969 -0.030447 -0.014925 -0.001996
       (0.249997)  (0.505403)  (0.128826)  (0.826803)
D.volvat_gdp          0.050400* 0.355505** 0.335552** 0.062590**
       (0.090650)  (0.001426)  (0.000147)  (0.038484)
D.voltaxc_gdp       -0.305184** -0.450706+  -0.299578**  -0.432723
       (0.006127)  (0.100714)  (0.005836)  (0.121187)
D.voltaxiwgdp_ 
loggdppc        -0.009731** -0.009819** -0.010373**
        (0.012176)  (0.010272)  (0.008174)
D.voltaxpmgdp_ 
loggdppc        0.001395  
        ( 0 . 7 0 6 8 5 3 )   
D.volvatgdp_ 
loggdppc        -0.031659**  -0.029762** 
        (0.003603)  (0.001329) 
D.voltaxcgdp_ 
loggdppc        0.027787   0.016449
        (0.571248)   (0.743656)
Number obs  138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
lags  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
p_sargan  0.280650 0.239957 0.307360 0.275901 0.163144 0.190828 0.161312 0.198632
p_ar1  0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
p_ar2  0.433567 0.449710 0.377300 0.402811 0.405322 0.476528 0.501198 0.559585
note:  ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.12         
   
 
 
 17Next, consider Table 4 showing the estimation results with a focus on taxes on 
production and imports. The volatility of capital taxes is considered alongside as 
above as a robustness check, and we note that the results with respect to it are 
remarkably similar to those reported in Table 3. 
 
Measured in level terms the volatility of taxes on production and imports has a 
significant and positive impact, with the GDP-interaction dampening it. However, 
measured relative to GDP, that volatility is no longer significant either directly or 
through its interaction with GDP. In sum, the volatility of taxes on production and 
imports does not have an unambiguously significant effect on the composition of 
public spending.   
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Table 4. Estimation results: Focus on taxes on production and imports  
(dependent variable: ratio of public investment to public consumption spending) 
 
  A B C D E F G H 
    coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value
LD.i_c  0.212915** 0.226054** 0.202533** 0.223137** 0.300198** 0.240334** 0.232415** 0.306414**
  (0.012424) (0.007100) (0.021245) (0.008055) (0.000435) (0.005975) (0.006836) (0.000401)
D.log_gdp_pc  0.206197**  0.205139* 0.242151** 0.215161**  0.174148+  0.152396  0.165895  0.177941+
  (0.047654) (0.051874) (0.021800) (0.041241) (0.112543) (0.162703) (0.121339) (0.113302)
LD.log_gdp_pc  -0.259136** -0.253042** -0.282501** -0.254565** -0.238261** -0.258703** -0.271241** -0.243381**
  (0.011664) (0.014145) (0.006133) (0.013450) (0.030571) (0.019607) (0.012313) (0.031816)
D.debt_gdp  0.086420**  0.083033*  0.115886**  0.097937** 0.034199 0.026144 0.024537 0.033963
  (0.043797) (0.058285) (0.006644) (0.026840) (0.414874) (0.507364) (0.532743) (0.425348)
LD.debt_gdp  -0.159971** -0.150626** -0.178958** -0.158141** -0.102235** -0.106416** -0.108052** -0.104348**
  (0.000207) (0.000388) (0.000028) (0.000196) (0.016209) (0.008714) (0.007631) (0.015112)
D.voltaxpm  0.000004*  0.000004+ 0.000021** 0.000022**     
  (0.096032)  (0.116488)  (0.003715)  (0.002905)    
D.voltaxc -0.000124**  -0.000118**  -0.000114  -0.000104**     
  (0.000164)  (0.000248)  (0.374081)  (0.001664)    
D.extbal_gdp  -0.125453* -0.110758  -0.152973**  -0.139947* -0.058021 -0.036545 -0.033876 -0.058357
  (0.085165) (0.121475) (0.042262) (0.054425) (0.436528) (0.620785) (0.644298) (0.436119)
D.emu  0.004191   0.002858   0.001825 0.003969 0.003716 0.002408
  (0.332338)   (0.514401)   (0.689219) (0.381110) (0.408369) (0.602559)
D.voltaxpm_loggdppc     -0.000002** -0.000002**     
     (0.011062)  (0.008455)    
D.voltaxc_loggdppc     0.000002      
     (0.928035)     
D.voltaxiw_gdp       -0.008966  0.078863**  0.081129**  -0.006239
       (0.415097)  (0.028891)  (0.021125)  (0.598262)
D.voltaxpm_gdp       -0.009969 -0.030447 -0.014925  0.021112
       (0.249997)  (0.505403)  (0.128826)  (0.577333)
D.volvat_gdp       0.050400*  0.355505**  0.335552**  0.037549
       (0.090650)  (0.001426)  (0.000147)  (0.265163)
D.voltaxc_gdp       -0.305184** -0.450706+  -0.299578**  -0.372931
       (0.006127)  (0.100714)  (0.005836)  (0.185777)
D.voltaxiwgdp_ 
loggdppc        -0.009731**  -0.009819** 
        (0.012176)  (0.010272) 
D.voltaxpmgdp_ 
loggdppc 
      0.001395   -0.002708
        (0.706853)   (0.408084)
D.volvatgdp_ 
loggdppc 
      -0.031659**  -0.029762** 
        (0.003603)  (0.001329) 
D.voltaxcgdp_ 
loggdppc 
      0.027787   0.015165
        (0.571248)   (0.765019)
Number obs  138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
lags  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
p_sargan  0.382172 0.341106 0.450411 0.489931 0.163144 0.190828 0.161312 0.211623
p_ar1  0.000002 0.000001 0.000002 0.000001 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
p_ar2  0.429669 0.470479 0.516694 0.507533 0.405322 0.476528 0.501198 0.405528
note:  ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.12         
   
 
 
 19Finally, Table 5 reports the estimation results with a special focus on the VAT. Again, 
we confirm the robustness of the results pertaining to the volatility of capital taxes.  
 
Measured in level terms, the volatility of VAT revenues has a significant and positive 
direct effect, dampened by its interaction with GDP. These results are confirmed 
when the volatility of VAT receipts is measured relative to GDP.  
 
Note that in terms of the estimated magnitude of the impact, volatility of VAT and 
capital taxes is similar. Their volatility is orders of magnitude bigger than the 
volatility of taxes on income and wealth.  
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Table 5. Estimation results: Focus on VAT  
(dependent variable: ratio of public investment to public consumption spending) 
 
  A B C D E F G H 
    coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value coef/p-value
LD.i_c  0.204621** 0.218443** 0.195559** 0.214629** 0.300198** 0.240334** 0.232415** 0.265101**
  (0.015793) (0.008936) (0.025795) (0.010452) (0.000435) (0.005975) (0.006836) (0.001951)
D.log_gdp_pc  0.199339* 0.197849*  0.230149** 0.205006* 0.174148+  0.152396  0.165895 0.186252*
  (0.057263) (0.062831) (0.030042) (0.052990) (0.112543) (0.162703) (0.121339) (0.090976)
LD.log_gdp_pc  -0.257401** -0.250462** -0.269611** -0.242658** -0.238261** -0.258703** -0.271241** -0.272604**
  (0.012961) (0.016046) (0.009848) (0.019667) (0.030571) (0.019607) (0.012313) (0.014689)
D.debt_gdp  0.084559**  0.081141*  0.111675**  0.094209** 0.034199 0.026144 0.024537 0.043647
  (0.045462) (0.060811) (0.008065) (0.031004) (0.414874) (0.507364) (0.532743) (0.292637)
LD.debt_gdp  -0.157010** -0.147456** -0.174530** -0.152954** -0.102235** -0.106416** -0.108052** -0.117874**
  (0.000211) (0.000407) (0.000032) (0.000239) (0.016209) (0.008714) (0.007631) (0.005163)
D.volvat  0.000011*  0.000010* 0.000036** 0.000036**     
  (0.053394)  (0.063173)  (0.020011)  (0.017205)    
D.voltaxc -0.000122**  -0.000116**  -0.000120  -0.000110**     
  (0.000187)  (0.000289)  (0.352526)  (0.000661)    
D.extbal_gdp  -0.124410*  -0.109617 -0.146973* -0.134776*  -0.058021  -0.036545  -0.033876  -0.077023
  (0.085970) (0.123296) (0.050751) (0.063734) (0.436528) (0.620785) (0.644298) (0.297038)
D.emu  0.004320   0.003668   0.001825 0.003969 0.003716 0.003440
  (0.317459)   (0.401107)   (0.689219) (0.381110) (0.408369) (0.444372)
D.volvat_loggdppc     -0.000004* -0.000004*     
     (0.061881)  (0.060314)    
D.voltaxc_loggdppc     0.000002      
     (0.941658)     
D.voltaxiw_gdp          -0.008966 0.078863** 0.081129**  -0.006914
         (0.415097) (0.028891) (0.021125) (0.530535)
D.voltaxpm_gdp         -0.009969 -0.030447 -0.014925  -0.022466**
         (0.249997) (0.505403) (0.128826) (0.021331)
D.volvat_gdp       0.050400* 0.355505** 0.335552** 0.347602**
         (0.090650) (0.001426) (0.000147) (0.000124)
D.voltaxc_gdp       -0.305184** -0.450706+  -0.299578** -0.428606+
         (0.006127) (0.100714) (0.005836) (0.119209)
D.voltaxiwgdp_ 
loggdppc        -0.009731**  -0.009819** 
        (0.012176)  (0.010272) 
D.voltaxpmgdp_ 
loggdppc        0.001395  
        (0.706853)  
D.volvatgdp_ 
loggdppc        -0.031659** -0.029762** -0.032515**
        (0.003603)  (0.001329)  (0.000605)
D.voltaxcgdp_ 
loggdppc 
      0.027787   0.033070
        (0.571248)   (0.503771)
Number obs  138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
lags  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
p_sargan  0.377504 0.335572 0.402109 0.426898 0.163144 0.190828 0.161312 0.185912
p_ar1  0.000002 0.000001 0.000003 0.000001 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
p_ar2  0.405149 0.448490 0.460832 0.467493 0.405322 0.476528 0.501198 0.315477
note:  ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.12         
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4. Economic interpretation of the results 
 
Our key results can be summarised as follows: 
 
  (Innovations to) the volatility of GDP or CPI inflation do not directly affect the 
composition of public spending. There is some evidence that the volatility of total 
tax revenues increases public consumption spending at the cost of investment; 
however, that evidence is weak and inconclusive; 
 
  The volatility of taxes on income and wealth as well as of VAT tend to increase 
public investment relative to consumption spending, but their indirect impact 
through GDP dampens that increase;  
 
  The volatility of capital taxes tend to reduce public investment relative to 
consumption spending; 
 
  The volatility of taxes on production and imports does not have an unambiguously 
significant effect on the composition of public spending; 
 
  In terms of the estimated magnitudes, the volatility of taxes on income and wealth 
as well as VAT has a much bigger effect than that of capital taxes. 
 
In other words, the composition of public spending is not affected directly by macro-
economic “news”. However, they affect public expenditure composition indirectly 
through their revenue impact, which is clearly visible at the level of individual tax 
groups, less so at the level of total tax revenues. Note that the volatility of GDP is 
very highly correlated with the volatility of tax revenues; given that tax revenues can 
be observed more directly and more frequently by the policy maker than GDP, it is 
reasonable to assume that he uses tax revenues as a primary source of information 
about the underlying economic conditions.  
 
 22The relative share of public investment increases following increases in the volatility 
of income taxes and the VAT, despite the fact that the indirect impact of these 
volatilities through the business cycle (GDP) works in the opposite direction. The 
relative share of public consumption spending, in turn, increases with increases in the 
volatility of capital taxes.  
 
So we have found that even controlling for the effect of business cycles, volatility 
innovations to tax receipts have a significant impact on the composition of public 
spending. Changes in the volatility of VAT and income tax receipts tilt the 
composition of public spending in favour of public investment, while changes in the 
volatility of capital taxes tilt the composition against it.  
 
These findings raise two broad questions. First, why is the impact of tax volatility 
visible at the level of individual tax groups but not at the level of total tax revenues? 
And second, why do innovations to the volatility of individual tax groups affect the 
composition of public spending the way they do? We will address both these broad 
questions in turn. 
 
As regards the first question, the near-insignificance of the volatility of total tax 
revenues is obviously a sum of effects at the level of individual tax groups that offset 
one another to a great extent. The individual tax groups respond to different 
underlying economic factors, so such individual effects can provide valuable and 
timely news to the policy maker about underlying economic conditions. After all, 
many taxes are collected on a monthly basis, so news embedded in their collection can 
convey information about different kinds of incipient changes in the economic 
environment. 
 
But what exactly can such news tell the policy maker? This leads us to the second 
question concerning possible reasons for the observed effects at the level of individual 
tax groups. This question, in turn, breaks down into two sub-questions: Why do tax 
volatilities change and why do those changes have the observed effect on public 
expenditure composition.  
 
 23There are, in principle, two possible reasons for changes in tax revenues and, hence, 
their volatility: changes in tax rates or tax bases.  
 
First, changes in contemporaneous tax volatility can reflect changes in tax rates. Such 
rate changes are known to the policy maker in advance, and he can change the 
expenditure composition based on that advance knowledge. Thus, changes in the VAT 
and income tax rates could, ceteris paribus, raise the contemporaneous volatilities of 
VAT and income tax revenues temporarily, and that contemporaneous and temporary 
increase in volatility could be accompanied with a shift in the expenditure 
composition.  
 
Assume now that public investment spending is more responsive to permanent than 
temporary factors while consumption spending is more responsive to temporary 
factors. Conceivably, then, (permanent) increases in VAT and income tax rates could 
be used to boost public investment, while decreases might be used to curtail current 
spending. However, tax rates do not change very often, so changes in tax rates are 
unlikely to be the dominant driver of tax volatilities.  
 
Second, changes in contemporaneous tax volatility can reflect changes in tax bases. 
The dominant driver of changes in tax bases—especially those for the VAT and 
income taxes—is the business cycle. However, to the extent that the cyclical situation 
differs from what was expected at the time of budgeting revenues, the tax base; tax 
revenues; and their volatility are also different from what was expected. Such 
unexpected changes could conceivably translate into the kinds of effects observed in 
this study: a sudden change in the cyclical outlook, especially if expected to persist 
beyond the current period, could prompt the policy maker to increase the relative 
weight of public investment. One can only speculate why; in the case of positive news 
the relative increase in investment could conceivably be related to relaxed liquidity 
constraints for the government; in the case of negative news it could be related to the 
government’s attempt to counter-cyclical fiscal policy.    
 
Capital taxes, as explained in section 3.2, are ad hoc in character, so their base has a 
significant random element to it—as also suggested by the volatile capital tax 
revenues in our sample (see Table 1). Thus, innovations to the volatility of capital tax 
 24base and revenues are by nature unexpected and temporary. It is intuitively appealing 
to conclude that unexpected revenue surpluses are more likely spent on consumption 
than investment, and that unexpected temporary shortfalls hit consumption more than 
investment.  
 
To sum up, the observed effect of tax volatilities on the composition of public 
spending may be related to the way policy makers react to news embedded in tax 
revenues, among other similar sources of news. Revenue surprises linked to the 
cyclical situation and perceived to last beyond the current period could conceivably 
boost the relative share of public investment. Revenue surprises linked to temporary 
factors, in turn, could conceivably prompt changes in current spending rather than 
investment.   
 
These explanations for the results obtained are, of course, speculative. Besides, they 
abstract from any political considerations involved in public expenditure policies. To 
the best of our knowledge, neither theoretical nor earlier empirical literature can guide 
us in assessing their validity. The explanations suggested above are, however, 




While earlier literature has considered long-term (growth) and medium-term (cyclical) 
aspects of macro-fiscal volatility, our study has focussed on its short-term impact. 
Specifically, we consider contemporaneous changes in the volatility of macro-
economic and fiscal (revenue-side) variables as news to the policy maker and seek to 
examine the impact of such news on the composition of public spending.  
 
We find that news about growth or inflation are immaterial for the composition of 
public spending as such; however, they do have a significant impact through news 
about revenue collections, visible at the level of individual tax groups and less so at 
the level of total tax revenues. Contemporaneous increases in the volatility of taxes 
such as the VAT or income taxes are that are frequently collected tend to increase the 
share of public investment relative to consumption spending, possibly because they 
convey news about non-temporary changes in the underlying economic conditions. In 
 25contrast, contemporaneous increases in the volatility of ad hoc –type of taxes such as 
capital taxes tend to increase the relative share of public consumption spending, 
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 27Annex 1. Panel unit root test results 
 
stationarity N statistics p-value statistics p-value
IC level 147 -2.219 0.013 -2.654 0.004
difference 139 -9.151 0.000 -7.323 0.000
volrealgdp level 145 -5.360 0.000 -4.548 0.000
difference 135 -10.748 0.001 -9.395 0.000
volinfl level 123 -5.384 0.000 -4.353 0.000
difference 118 -7.457 0.000 -4.811  0.000
voltaxtot level 130 -1.553 0.060 -2.652 0.004
difference 123 -7.268 0.000 -5.525 0.000
voltaxtot_gdp level 136 -3.459 0.000 -2.526 0.006
difference 129 -4.580 0.000 -3.788 0.000
voltaxiw level 131 2.483 0.994 -1.003  0.158
difference 125 -4.530 0.000 -3.652  0.000
voltaxiw_gdp level 134 -4.879 0.001 -3.133  0.001
difference 131 -6.587 0.002 -5.034  0.000
voltaxc level 134 -1.240 0.108 -1.150 0.125
difference 127 -6.064 0.000 -4.381 0.000
voltaxc_gdp level 135 -1.621 0.053 -2.105 0.018
difference 127 -5.742 0.000 -4.628 0.000
voltaxpm level 131 -7.278 0.001 -8.748  0.000
difference 122 -7.570 0.002 -6.886  0.001
voltaxpm_gdp level 136 -1.948 0.026 -1.891  0.029
difference 131 -7.432 0.000 -4.829  0.000
voltaxvat level 133 -5.905 0.000 -3.171 0.001
difference 121 -9.755 0.001 -7.590  0.000
voltaxvat_gdp level 137 -8.378 0.002 -5.530  0.000
difference 128 -5.653 0.000 -4.439 0.000
log_gdp_pc level 146 -1.256 0.105 3.624 1.000
difference 140 -6.265 0.000 -4.779 0.000
debt_gdp level 143 -1.348 0.089 -0.955 0.170
difference 138 -4.696 0.000 -2.887 0.002
extbal_gdp level 148 -0.068 0.473 1.953 0.975
difference 140 -7.668 0.000 -6.105 0.000
Note: Automatic selection of lags by SIC
Levin, Lin, Chu Im, Pesaran & Shin
 
 
 28Annex 2. Correlation matrix 
 
voltaxtot volrealgdp volinflation voltaxiw voltaxpm volvat voltaxc log_gdp_pc debt_gdp extbal_gdp
voltaxtot 1.000
volrealgdp 0.801 1.000
volinflation -0.385 -0.407 1.000
voltaxiw 0.947 0.757 -0.348 1.000
voltaxpm 0.957 0.732 -0.384 0.826 1.000
volvat 0.959 0.794 -0.423 0.847 0.954 1.000
voltaxc 0.439 0.299 -0.362 0.440 0.452 0.396 1.000
log_gdp_pc -0.161 -0.146 0.201 -0.013 -0.181 -0.152 -0.411 1.000
debt_gdp -0.134 -0.145 -0.215 -0.132 0.005 -0.120 0.401 -0.227 1.000
extbal_gdp -0.530 -0.503 0.535 -0.516 -0.514 -0.530 -0.394 0.043 -0.177 1.000
voltaxtot_gdp volrealgdp volinflation voltaxiw_gdp voltaxpm_gdp volvat_gdp votaxc_gdp log_gdp_pc debt_gdp extbal_gdp
voltaxtot_gdp 1.000
volrealgdp -0.097 1.000
volinflation 0.086 -0.407 1.000
voltaxiw_gdp 0.623 -0.045 0.069 1.000
voltaxpm_gdp 0.805 -0.069 0.267 0.307 1.000
volvat_gdp 0.252 -0.133 0.262 0.086 0.266 1.000
voltaxc_gdp 0.068 -0.009 -0.171 0.022 0.042 -0.061 1.000
log_gdp_pc 0.187 -0.146 0.201 0.006 0.141 0.146 -0.417 1.000
debt_gdp 0.162 -0.145 -0.215 0.012 0.129 -0.024 0.608 -0.227 1.000
extbal_gdp 0.128 -0.503 0.535 0.171 0.117 0.041 -0.113 0.043 -0.177 1.000 